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Abstract
Context: Pre-publication peer review of scientific articles is considered a key element of the research process in software engineer-
ing, yet it is often perceived as not to work fully well. Objective: We aim at understanding the perceptions of and attitudes towards
peer review of authors and reviewers at one of software engineering’s most prestigious venues, the International Conference on
Software Engineering (ICSE). Method: We invited 932 ICSE 2014/15/16 authors and reviewers to participate in a survey with 10
closed and 9 open questions. Results: We present a multitude of results, such as: Respondents perceive only one third of all reviews
to be good, yet one third as useless or misleading; they propose double-blind or zero-blind reviewing regimes for improvement;
they would like to see showable proofs of (good) reviewing work be introduced; attitude change trends are weak. Conclusion: The
perception of the current state of software engineering peer review is fairly negative. Also, we found hardly any trend that suggests
reviewing will improve by itself over time; the community will have to make explicit efforts. Fortunately, our (mostly senior)
respondents appear more open for trying different peer reviewing regimes than we had expected.
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1. Introduction
For our purposes, peer review is the practice by which a
publication venue sends an article to several expert colleagues
(the peers) for review before it is accepted for publication (or
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not). Although a few venues recently started trying out a differ-
ent approach (e.g., Faculty of 1000 Ltd. (2017); ScienceOpen
(2017)), this basic model of pre-publication peer review is usu-
ally considered a cornerstone of quality assurance in the sci-
entific process, in software engineering and beyond (Mulligan
et al., 2013).
This article attempts to understand what is currently work-
ing well or not-so-well about peer review in software engineer-
ing (SE) and how this might change in the next 20 years.
1.1. Variants of Peer Review
The acceptance decision may be made after just one round
of reviewing (single-stage peer review1), typical for conferences,
or after multiple rounds with improvements of the work (multi-
stage review2), typical for journals.
Usually, the authors do not know the identity of the review-
ers (blind review). Reviewers might know the identity of the au-
thors (single-blind review) or not (double-blind review). Only
rarely do the authors get to know the names of reviewers (non-
blind review, zero-blind review) or does the public get to see
the content of the reviews (open review, public review).
1.2. Issues with Peer Review
Informally, researchers often criticize peer review as not do-
ing its job properly and indeed the practice has various inherent
problems, for instance:
• Reviewers will not always be competent to properly re-
view a particular work, and often provide inconsistent re-
ports (Baxt et al., 1998; Smith, 2006).
• Reviewers will sometimes be biased against certain as-
pects of the work: methods, technology, goals, etc. (Arm-
strong, 1997).
• Reviewers may, protected by their anonymity, abuse their
power to inhibit the publication of lines of work that com-
pete with their own (Smith, 2006; Hettyey et al., 2012).
• Reviewing can be viewed as contributing little to the re-
viewer’s reputation and so reviewer motivation can be
lacking and reviewing be done rather sloppily (Zaharie
and Osoian, 2016).
Because of issues like these, other fields (most prominently
in the biomedical realm) have long worked to understand the
status of peer reviewing and how to improve it (Nature, 2006).
For instance, such research has produced strong evidence that
double-blind reviewing will lead to results that are less biased
than with single-blind reviewing, e.g. Budden et al. (2008),
a fact that is now also being picked up in software engineer-
ing (Bacchelli and Beller, 2017). But beyond that, software
engineering venues are not, so far, particularly prone to exper-
imentation with possible improvements to the peer reviewing
regime. In light of the above issues, this might be a pity.
1authors may be allowed to comment on the reviews: rebuttals
2always with rebuttals
For instance, the high-class health journal The BMJ (accep-
tance rate 7%) not only performs reviews zero-blind (that is, re-
viewers sign their reviews), they also publish the reviews along
with accepted articles (open reviewing, BMJ (2017)); there is
no comparable software engineering venue doing anything as
radical.
1.3. Research questions
Our perspective is understanding and then improving the
peer review process. We designed our survey along the follow-
ing research questions. Results and discussion will be struc-
tured mostly into one section per research question.
Section 5: What do authors and reviewers perceive to be the
purposes of peer review? Which are more important than which
others?
Section 6: How well do they perceive peer review to work to-
day (in the sense of producing valid and helpful reviews) and
why?
Section 7: How much should reviewers and authors be blinded?
Section 8: Which aspects of reviewing should be public?
Section 9: Should reviewers be compensated for their work?
How?
Section 10: What changes to the current reviewing regime should
be performed?
Section 11: How might the answers to each of the above ques-
tions change in the next few decades?
1.4. Research contribution
Our article makes two research contributions: First, it char-
acterizes the attitudes of mostly senior members of the ICSE3authors-
and-reviewers community with respect to the research ques-
tions. Second, it predicts how these attitudes will likely be
different for a similar sample of people in the future, several
decades away.
1.5. Structure of this article
After reviewing related work (Section 2), we will present
our method: The survey population (Section 3.1), the survey
instrument (3.2), the execution of the survey (3.2), our data
analysis techniques (3.3 and 3.4), and the resulting public data
archive (3.5). Then, we discuss the respondent demographics
(4) before presenting the results structured according to our
list of research questions (Sections 4 to 11). We then discuss
our study’s limitations (Section 12) before we conclude (Sec-
tion 13).
2. Related work
We organize this section along the research questions from
Section 1.3. What sets our study apart from other survey work
in the area is the use of open questions and qualitative analy-
sis. While we reference various related work, we consider two
3International Conference on Software Engineering
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large scale surveys of peer reviewers attitudes across many dis-
ciplines as our baseline background material upon which we
frame our study primarily: First Mulligan et al. (2013) with
4037 respondents, second Ross-Hellauer et al. (2017) with 3062.
The latter, organized by OpenAIRE, an Open Access collabo-
ration project, is special in that 76% of respondents reported
to have participated in open reviewing previously; an unusual
population. We found only one reviewing study in the software
engineering literature (Bacchelli and Beller, 2017), also a sur-
vey.
Purpose of peer review: Weller (2001, p.xii) proposed
a concise characterization: “The valid article is accepted, the
messy article cleaned up, and the invalid article rejected”. The
Mulligan et al. (2013) survey found the main perceived pur-
poses to be (in this order): to improve the quality of published
papers; to determine their originality; to select the best possible
manuscripts for a journal. Our work will ask the question also
beyond predefined answer categories and ask for elaboration.
How well does peer review work today: The Mulligan
et al. (2013) survey had 69% of respondents report high or
very high satisfaction. When asked what aspects of their arti-
cles were improved the most through peer review, respondents
mentioned the introduction most (90%) and statistical methods
least. Our work will ask about percentages of good, mediocre,
or bad reviews received and about specific positive and negative
peer review experiences to provide a more detailed picture.
Blinding: Much discussion has happened lately on how
much anonymity should be in the peer review process (David Pon-
tille, 2014; Jubb, 2016). Empirical research has found interest-
ing effects from double-blind reviewing. For instance, Budden
et al. (2008) found that more articles of female researchers were
accepted after the journal Behavioral Ecology adopted double-
blind review (but not in other journals that did not). Laband
and Piette (1994) found for a sample of economics journals
(and controlling for several confounding factors) that articles
accepted after single-blind review were cited less often than ar-
ticles accepted after double-blind review. As for software engi-
neering, Bacchelli and Beller (2017) survey how double-blind
peer review is perceived by the ICSE community and find that
about half of the respondents believe all software engineering
venues should switch to double-blind reviewing. ? investigate
bibliographic data from 71 of the 80 largest computer science
conferences of 2014 and 2015 and find evidence that newcom-
ers (people who have not previously published at that confer-
ence) get a smaller share of a conference when single-blind re-
viewing is used compared to conferences using double-blind
reviewing.
The Mulligan et al. (2013) survey respondents did not like
the prospect that their names be made visible to the authors
(8% more likely to be willing to review under such circum-
stances, 51% less likely) or to the readers (18% and 45%). In
the OpenAIRE survey, 67% of respondents believed zero-blind
reviewing would make reviewers less inclinced to provide a re-
view and 44% believed it would improve review quality; 65%
believed it makes strong criticism less likely (Ross-Hellauer
et al., 2017). Our study will ask for degrees of agreement with
double-blinding and zero-blinding.
Publicness: Support for the review reports to be published
alongside the accepted paper was low (11% more likely and
58% less likely) in Mulligan et al. (2013). Similar percentages
were found for the possibility of disclosing names to authors
only (8% and 51%) and for having the reviewer names only
published alongside the article (18% and 45%). Even in the
OpenAIRE survey, 52% of respondents expect reviewers to be-
come less inclined to review, although 65% expect published
reviews to be useful for readers, 60% expect an increase in re-
view quality, and 45% expect authors to become more inclined
to submit to such journals.
Some venues such as F1000Research (Faculty of 1000 Ltd.,
2017), ScienceOpen (ScienceOpen, 2017), or The BMJ (BMJ,
2017) require public reviews, and initiatives such as Publons (Publons,
2017) or Academic Karma4 promote them for the rest of the
scientific publishing world. Our study will ask for degrees of
agreement with publicness of reviews.
Reviewer compensation: Overall scientific publication rates
are increasing by 8-9% each year (Bornmann and Mutz, 2015).
As a result, there is a reviewer fatigue syndrome (Breuning
et al., 2015): reviewers decline review invitations more and
more often (Mulligan et al., 2013). Warne (2016), a study specif-
ically on reviewer compensation, reports mean agreement of 4.0
(on a 1-to-5 scale, based on 3000 surveyed researchers) with the
statement “I would spend more time reviewing if it was recog-
nised as a measurable research activity”. 51% of the Mulligan
et al. (2013) participants would more likely review for a venue
that compensated them somehow, only 15% less likely. Our
study asks for degrees of agreement and for specific compensa-
tion ideas.
Useful reviewing regime changes: About 30% of the Mul-
ligan et al. (2013) respondents believed that the current status of
peer review is the best we can have, but the study did not ask the
other 70% for improvement suggestions. Several such sugges-
tions come from viewpoint articles. For example, Ralph (2016)
recommends for Information Systems research to provide edi-
torial review only for empirical articles and to desk-reject many
of those based on checklists. Ferreira et al. (2016) recommends
to demand a rate of reviews for each scientist, standardize peer
review through training in academic curricula and workshops,
and decoupling peer review from journals. Our study asks for
any improvement idea, plus elaboration.
Future change: We are not aware of any study that goes be-
yond reporting current attitudes to explicitly extrapolating them
into the future in a data-based manner. Our study will do so
based on regression modeling with demographic variables.
We will refer to specific similar or contrasting results of re-
lated work as appropriate when we discuss our results.
3. Methods
Our results are based on a mixed quantitative/qualitative
survey of software engineering authors and reviewers.
4http://academickarma.org
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3.1. Survey population
As our base population, we pick the set of all authors and re-
viewers of recent instances of the International Conference on
Software Engineering (ICSE 2014, 2015, and 2016), because
it represents software engineering research broadly across most
topic ranges and at a high level of quality. We collected the
author email addresses from the published articles and the re-
viewer addresses via the program committee web pages or from
lists provided by the program committee chairs. Reviewers in-
clude the members of program committee (each year), review
committee (2015 only), and program board (2014 and 2016
only).
This results in a set of 966 people. Of these, 642 (66%) have
been an author in only one year, 99 (10%) were authors in mul-
tiple years. Further, 156 (16%) served as reviewer in one year,
and 68 (7%) served as reviewer in multiple years. Of 34 peo-
ple (3.5%), we could not produce an individual email address
(e.g., because no author address was given at all or all authors
shared one address), resulting in an actual base population of
932 people.
3.2. Survey instrument and execution
Our questionnaire was built from scratch and had 19 ques-
tions. They were a mix of closed or quantitative ones on the
one hand and open ones for qualitative analysis on the other.
Most closed questions used a 10-point disagree/agree scale, the
others are numeric or binary. We will often provide specific
wording from the questionnaire along with the presentation of
the results. The questionnaire is openly available (see Section
3.5) We sent out an invitation email to the base population in
August 2016, stating “We kindly ask you to participate in a
small survey on the future of peer review. Your participation,
by answering 19 questions that take about 15 minutes of your
time, will broaden the understanding of peer reviewing specif-
ically in software engineering: (1) How are current reviewing
practices perceived? (2) How could the peer review process be
improved?”.
The invitation contained one link to the questionnaire and
another by which a recipient could tell us s/he had left software
engineering research and would not reply for that reason.
We left the survey open for 14 days (this was mentioned in
the email) and sent no reminder. We received 74 bounce mes-
sages from email addresses that had meanwhile become invalid;
these will mostly belong to junior authors. We received 45 out-
of-office autoreplies, 13 of which pointed to an absence of the
recipient of more than one week. These 74+13 cases reduce our
effective base population to 845.
The “no longer a researcher link” was used by 19 people,
reducing it further to 826.
The survey had 241 respondents, giving a 29% response
rate. 167 respondents (69% of 241) worked through all pages
of the questionnaire. As all questions were optional, each single
question has a lower (and varying) number of responses. The
time between opening the survey and answering the last ques-
tion ranged from 4 minutes to 1 day, 22 hours; the first and third
quartile were 12 minutes and 27 minutes, respectively. The me-
dian completion time was 17 minutes.
3.3. Quantitative data analysis methods
For the quantitative data, we mostly report percentages rela-
tive to the respective number of responses and sometimes visu-
alize it with box plots and Likert plots. We use linear modeling
for the extrapolation into the future.
3.4. Qualitative data analysis methods
For the open questions, we applied a rough version of open
coding Strauss and Corbin (1990, II.5) to derive a reasonable
post-hoc classification of the responses so that we can quantify
the frequency of the most common types of response. We kept
the coding process simple: There was no pre-specified gran-
ularity goal or semantic styles goal for the codes, nor did we
align codes across different questions. Many codes occurred
only rarely, we will therefore not present, define, or even men-
tion all codes.
3.5. Data-and-materials archive
To increase the transparency of our study and its repro-
ducibility, we disclose all the instruments used and the data an-
alyzed in an online open science archive including:
• a README file,
• the questionnaire,
• the raw collected data (including the answers to the open
questions),
• the results of the open coding (annotations and codebooks),
• the statistical and plotting routines,
• and the resulting plots.
The archive can be found in the open science repository of the
present paper (Prechelt et al., 2017).
4. Results: Demographics
Compared to the population, our respondents (n = 141 for
this question, which is treated as 100% for this question) are
extremely senior. 52% identified themselves as tenured profes-
sors, 15% as non-tenured professors, and 22% as being on the
post-doctoral level or “industrial researcher” level.
Of those who provided a gender (n = 143, 100%), 15%
identified themselves as female, 85% as male.
Of those who provided an age (n= 140, 100%), 14% were
in their twenties (minimum: 23), 43% in their thirties, 21% in
their fourties, 17% in their fifties, and 4% beyond (maximum:
67).
Those who stated their country of affiliation (n= 157, 100%),
come from 32 different countries, the most common being USA
(33%), Germany (12%), and Canada (6%), and all others below
5%.
Respondents said they had published 6.2 peer-reviewed ar-
ticles in the past twelve months and 1.6 articles at the three
ICSEs in question, on average. They had been reviewers at 0.8
of those three ICSEs on average. For the base population, the
latter value is 0.3; another indication of our respondents’ strong
seniority.
In the results below, we will report on different subgroups
where appropriate.
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5. Results: Purpose of peer review
We asked respondents how much they agree with each of
the nine suggested purposes of peer review shown in Figure 1.
All nine purposes receive more than 50% of replies on the
“agree”-side of the scale, six of them even more than 75%. The,
by far, most popular answer is to ensure the validity of the re-
search, the core of peer review’s gatekeeping function. The
runners-up are to make sure the article is well written, limita-
tions are properly discussed, and the research is relevant. Rela-
tively least popular are detecting plagiarism and protecting the
reputation of the venue.
The question was followed by three open text slots to add
additional concerns in the form of open answers.
Open coding of the open-ended answers found 13 categories.
The top two (each occurring in 17 of the responses) refer to
ensuring the novelty of the results and to ensuring scientific
progress, respectively. Some of the novelty-related answers
stressed specific aspects, such as “[. . . ] not just in the ICSE
community but in the broader research community”5 or “En-
sure that innovative, but possibly incomplete, ideas are injected
into the community to stimulate discovery and innovation.” En-
suring progress was characterized in many different ways, from
general ones (“assessing contribution to the field”) down to
rather specific aspects such as “To ensure that the reporting
allows for reproducibility and replicability”.
The third-most frequent code (occurring 13 times) repre-
sents checking that articles make proper use of related work,
relate themselves to the state of the art, and provide appropriate
theoretical framing of their research design.
Most of the other codes (occurring between 10 times and
2 times) echo concerns already represented in the categories
of Figure 1, but the respondents added detail or emphasized a
sub-aspect. Most popular among those were ensuring “qual-
ity” (10 occurrences) or “soundness” (e.g. of method execu-
tion or result interpretation, 9 occurrences), improving writing
(10 occurrences), and “selecting” among articles (e.g. “grain
from chaff”, “top contributions”, or “To balance acceptances
across topic areas”, 9 occurrences).
Two of the other codes, however, are new: Learning (from
other reviewers or about current research, 5 occurrences) and
ensuring impact on SE practice (2 occurrences).
Mulligan et al. (2013) found that the purpose of peer re-
view is, respectively, to improve the quality of published pa-
pers (94%); to determine their originality (92%); and to select
the best possible manuscripts for a journal (85.5%). We are
not aware of studies exploring the purpose of peer review in an
open-ended way, as we did. Our results offer a base for future
studies on the purpose of peer review.
5Our response quotations are usually verbatim excerpts, except for spelling
and punctuation corrections. If we applied changes to wording (for comprehen-
sibility or anonymization), these are indicated by square brackets.
6. Results: How well does peer-review work?
6.1. Quantitative estimate
It is problematic to ask for the net effect of peer review-
ing unless the population consists exclusively of editors or PC
chairs. So instead we asked “As an author, what percentage of
the reviews that you receive is good, reasonable, unhelpful or
grossly faulty.” and elaborated as follows:
• “By ’good’ we mean a review that is helpful for the ac-
ceptance decision and for the authors and that substan-
tiates all of its important points of criticism or praise. It
may be quite critical and even propose rejection.”
• “By ’reasonable’ we mean a review that is ’good’ in some
respects, but lacks detail in others.”
• “By ’unhelpful’ we mean a review that largely or com-
pletely lacks substance.”
• “By ’grossly faulty’ we mean a review that misunder-
stands or ignores key aspects of the article, leading to
wildly exaggerated praise or criticism; this covers only
questions of fact, not of opinion or weighting.”
The results are shown in Figure 2. On average and roughly
speaking, one third of reviews is considered good, one third rea-
sonable, and one third either unhelpful (20%) or grossly faulty
(10%). However, there is considerable diversity in the opin-
ions: The most optimistic quarter of respondents believes 50%
or more of all reviews are good, while the most pessimistic
quarter believes only 21% or less are good. (For comparison,
the Mulligan et al. (2013) survey found high or very high review
quality satisfaction for 69% of respondents.)
We perceive these responses as balanced (rather than cyn-
ical). They do not paint a rosy picture of getting one’s work
reviewed in SE: In a typical set of three reviews, one has to
expect that only one of them will be as thorough and helpful
as they all should be, while the other two are not. As a result,
acceptance decisions will be highly noisy.
6.2. Why are the faulty reviews faulty?
We asked “In your opinion, what were the main reasons for
unhelpful and/or grossly faulty reviews (if any)?” and received
136 answers. In those, our open coding found 25 different rea-
sons mentioned and 276 mentions (100%) overall.
Two reasons stand out: Reviewers not allocating enough
time (24%) and reviewers being insufficiently familiar with the
topic of the work (22%). Some of these answers sounded cyn-
ical (even sarcastic) or sad, but most were matter-of-fact; we
made no attempt to code emotional quality. A few answers cap-
tured a lot of their issue succinctly: “lack of time or effort”; “In
cases it is simply because the reviewer did not do his/her job,
or accepted to referee a paper for which he/she was not quali-
fied. But when you submit to good venues, with good PCs, that
happens less frequently.”.
Six other reasons were mentioned at least a dozen times:
The reviewer does not care to make a good review (10%), the
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(v_10)..make sure the research article is in tune
with the scope of the venue.
(v_11)..make sure the research article is
well−organized and easily understandable.
(v_12)..make sure the research results are valid.
(v_13)..make sure threats to the validity of
research (and/or limitations) are properly
addressed.
(v_14)..make sure the title, abstract, discussion
of results, and conclusions in an article do not
mislead or exaggerate.
(v_15)..protect the reputation of the publication
venue.
(v_16)..detect plagiarism and self−plagiarism.
(v_17)..make sure the research has sufficient
relevance.
(v_110)..help authors to become better
researchers.
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One main purpose of peer review is to..
Figure 1: Purposes of peer review. Answers range from strong disagreement (1) to strong agreement (10).
reviewer is biased towards some type of research content or
method (8%), misunderstandings (5%), generally low review-
ing skill (5%), inappropriate priorities set by the reviewer (5%),
and exaggerated expectations (4%).
So at least one third of mentioned reasons (lack of time and
lack of care) ought to be repairable. We are not aware of other
studies asking respondents why faulty reviews become faulty.
6.3. Worst peer review experience as author
We asked “As an author, what has been your worst experi-
ence with peer review?” and received 123 answers. In those,
our open coding found 37 types of experience mentioned and
158 mentions (100%) overall.
The most common topic was a lack of justification in a re-
view: Unjustified rejection (13% of mentions), unjustified in-
dividual points of criticism (7%), or a discrepancy between the
decision and the review text (6%). The idea of our question
was to collect anecdotes and indeed many respondents provided
such stories. Some of them included evidence that the issue
with the reviews was not merely imagined, like this one: “A
paper being rejected with very short reviews that gave no indi-
cation as to the reasoning behind the decision. While everyone
has a horror story about a rejection, I had a paper that was sub-
mitted to a journal and rejected without review by the editor: I
submitted the paper to another journal and it was fast-tracked
into the next available issue and now has over 300 citations
(Google scholar).” Or this one: “I got one paper rejected be-
cause it “didn’t even cite [XYZ]”. The reviewer accused us of
having no clue about the field and not knowing even the most
elementary works in the field. Therefore, he refused to review
the paper any further, i.e., the review was just a couple of sen-
tences long. Interestingly, one of the authors of [XYZ] [...] was
also an author of the paper that got this crappy review. We of
course [were] fully aware of [XYZ], but did not find it relevant
for what we presented.”
Next in line (and in fact related) are “lazy reviewers” (9%)
and overly short reviews (7%). Examples: (1) “The review was
one line: You failed to convince me this is an interesting idea.”,
(2) “A 10,000 word manuscript fetching a 250 word review, out
of which 200 words are spent in summarizing the manuscript”,
(3) “Reviewers [...] stop reading the paper after the abstract”,
(4) “Reviews which were not only misguided in their criticism,
but entirely indecipherable due to reviewers’ evident off-the-
cuff writing (fragmented sentences, lack of clarity, reference to
misspelled terms). This is particularly galling because a.) it
is not possible to extract valuable criticism when the reviewer
seems not to have read the same paper as you wrote; b.) it is
particularly insulting when a rejection is so obviously uncon-
sidered that the reviewer hasn’t read it to themselves.”.
6% of mentions (that is, 7% of respondents) state they never
had a particularly bad reviewing experience. On the other hand,
4% report direct insults or criticism addressing the researcher
rather than the work (argumentum ad hominem). Examples:
(1) “At [XYZ], I have seen a considerable amount of things like
name calling. My students have been told they are schizophrenic,
6
percent of all reviews
grossly faulty
unhelpful
reasonable
good
0 20 40 60 80 100
l
M
N=165 
l
M
N=165 
l
M
N=165 
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Figure 2: Answer distributions for the frequency of four quality levels of peer
reviews. Whiskers show minimum/maximum, the fat dot is the median, the M
the arithmetic mean.
directly in peer review, for the bizarre crime of running em-
pirical studies and reporting the data. [...] I am consistently
amazed at the total lack of accountability in reviewing – even
3rd grade level name calling is, somehow, allowed in a venue
like that.”. (2) “a reviewer made personal attacks on one of my
co-authors. Fortunately, my co-author took it with good humor,
but I felt that it was unacceptable. I reported it to the PC chairs
though there is no way to confirm that any word ever made it to
the reviewer. I hope it was just a momentary lapse of judgment
on the part of the reviewer, but it definitely reduced my opin-
ion of [XYZ] as a venue considering that the PC chairs did not
even acknowledge it.”. Further anecdotes revolved around other
types of suspected abuses of reviewer anonymity: (3) “A review
process for [journal XYZ] where a well-established author on
the same topic did not want a new actor around, pretending that
everything was already done by him and his research group,
which was clearly false.”. (4) “an expert disagreeing because
the material presented showed that the results of one of their
earlier articles were flawed. It makes no sense to suppress ar-
ticles that attempt reproduction, certainly not articles that pro-
vide a detailed basis why earlier results are flawed. This is also
a failure of the committee in general, for not seeing the conflict
of interest.”. Reviewer anonymity will be a topic of Section 7.
Four other categories have 6 or 7 mentions (4%) each. They
speak about unqualified reviewers, unconstructive criticism, re-
viewers unjustifiedly pushing their own work, or reviewers severely
lacking an understanding for the nature of empirical work. Ex-
amples of the latter: (1) “I did not have 100% response [rate
in] a survey”, (2) “Why did you not just measure and see what
the result is?”, (3) “Desk-rejected qualitative research: There
are no numbers!”.
The rest is a long list of rare problems (just 1 or 2 mentions)
that includes anything from administrative problems over a de-
cision based on only a single review to receiving a review that
was obviously written for a different submission. Several of
these relate to various types of pickiness and one of them is
particularly worrying: “I, sometimes, feel that if I’m too honest
about the limitations of a technique, reviewers will simply pick
on it. Of course, if the limitations are too large to render the
technique useless, then I agree that it is a big issue. However,
what I often find is that if I hadn’t mentioned that limitation in
the first place, the reviewers wouldn’t have picked up on it.”
In order to end on a more positive note, we quote this par-
ticipant: “All this sounds like complaining, I am sure. I accept
that the review process is a human process and therefore filled
with problems. But I hope to make it as good as possible.”
We are not aware of other studies asking respondents to
openly report their worst experiences with peer review; our re-
sults therefore complement quantitative results on preconceived
problem areas such as those provided by Mulligan et al. (2013).
6.4. Worst peer review experience as reviewer
We also asked the same question from the other perspective:
“As a reviewer, what has been your worst experience with peer
review?” and received 111 answers. In those, our open cod-
ing found 53 different types of experience mentioned and 142
mentions (100%) overall.
The most frequent answer (17 times, 12% of mentions) is
that reviewers never had a particularly bad experience, e.g.:
“Not too many, typically I’ve met my peer-reviewers, so we all
behave pretty civilized.”
Among the rest, four of the types stick out, at 11 to 13 men-
tions each (8% to 9%; the next-lower one has only 4%). At the
top of the list are poor-quality submissions. Here are some vari-
ants of that: (1) “Having to read papers which should have been
desk-rejected as unreadable.”, (2) “Articles that are so bad and
unreadable that they are an insult to the time reviewers volun-
tarily and freely spend on this process.”, (3) “Not particularly
horrible, but once I had to review a paper that was too abstract
and general. There was nothing that could be criticized about
it, it was a vision paper and the authors were established mem-
bers of the community. None of the three reviewers had any-
thing to critique about the paper, but it was also clear that there
was not much of substance in it. The paper ended up marked
borderline/weak accept and eventually being published.”.
Second in line are authors that do not make the necessary
improvements to their article, as in these stories: (1) “Spending
a lot of time on reviewing a conference paper and discovering
conceptual flaws when such flaws are then met with apathy by
the authors and other reviewers. It is sad when such flaws are
not documented in the final paper version (or explained why
they are in fact not flaws). To me this is a big drawback of the
conference publication model, since a journal editor can en-
force that authors respond to such criticism.”, (2) “In a journal
or conference with a revise-resubmit process, I think finding au-
thors who dismiss or ignore feedback is particularly insulting,
especially if I’ve spent quite a bit of time to thoroughly read
their work and think about my feedback.”, (3) “I don’t know
whether [ignoring my improvement request] was because he
considered my request unreasonable, because he had lost the
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raw data, or because [fixing the problem] showed that his re-
sults were not very strong. This is particularly bad because it
shows that authors can selectively present data that strength-
ens their claims, and the review process is not strong enough to
guard against it”, (4) “Journal A review: I recommended ma-
jor revision, and really major it would have to be. My review
contained about three dozen issues. New version of the article
comes in: the two smallest issues have been addressed, none
of the important ones are. I state this and reject the article.
The editor rejects the article. This was on a Thursday. On the
following Monday, journal B queries me for a review. It turns
out it is the same article again, in exactly the version rejected
by journal A on Thursday.” One of the respondents remarked
on a similar story as follows: “Hmm, is double-blind reviewing
going to make such behavior more common? That would be
horrible.”.
Third is what reviewers perceive as inappropriate behavior
(including passivity) of editors, PC chairs or other powers-that-
be, for example: (1) “Encouraging PC chairs [...] to get papers
accepted, because the acceptance is too low.”, (2) “The worst
experience was at [XYZ], where several of the decisions PC
members came up with after long and careful discussions have
been overruled [...] without substantial arguments and without
asking back.”, (3) “[I rejected an article] that used students as
subjects because it was in violation of the basic rules of ethics.
The other reviewers accepted the paper on the grounds that the
results were good, despite the fact that the non-compliance with
ethical norms could have introduced serious threats to validity
in the results.”, (4) “I think physical PC meetings reward fast
thinking and good communication skills, without analyzing in
depth the issues in the paper. I think online discussions work
better than PC meetings in this respect. Moreover, PC meetings
tend to be too far away from the time when papers are read and
reviewed, especially if authors are granted a chance of rebut-
tal, which extends the reviewing time line.”. On the other hand,
remarks elsewhere show that reviewers may have more influ-
ence than some of them may believe, like here: (1) “It took a
lot of dialog with the editor to sway him/her from applying a
simple vote.”, (2) “I decided not to participate as a member of
the program committee in the future.”.
Rank 4 belongs to the first of many types that echo all of
the issues brought up from the author perspective, just this time
the reviewers criticize their co-reviewers (and sometimes them-
selves). For example: (1) “The other three reviewers wrote
bland, nothing-type reviews and were impressed by a lot of sta-
tistical mumbo-jumbo which was actually badly flawed. The
paper claimed to be a how to do it type article and therefore
particularly dangerous. It took a lot of dialog with the edi-
tor to sway him/her from applying a simple vote.”, (2) “Papers
from a completely unfamiliar area where I could not validate
the results or determine their significance.”. We split the bad
co-reviewers issues into many types, such as the reviewer being
lazy, dogmatic, inflexible or the review being too short, unbal-
anced, unjustified, too critical, uncritical. Had we collected all
of these under a single type, it would have ranked at the top by
far with 28 mentions (20%).
Some of the remaining (rare!) issues concern cases of power
abuse on the side of reviewers or editors. Examples are: (1) “We
once had a reviewer from [country XYZ] on our PC who would
give all papers from [country XYZ] the very best grades, even if
everybody else did not like the paper. He then did not even show
up at the PC meeting. All his reviews were canceled, and we PC
members were in for a night shift.”, (2) “Reviewers pushing pa-
pers of well known authors (or authors who are their friends)
to get the paper accepted.” (3) “Seeing other reviewers writ-
ing just 1 or 2 line without saying anything on the paper (and
probably not reading it), and still fighting to accept/reject the
paper.”.
However, please remember that the most frequent reply type
was the no-major-problems type, e.g. “Not much.”
Similarly to Section 6.3, we are not aware of other stud-
ies asking respondents to openly report their worst experiences
with peer review as reviewers. Our open-ended exploration
offers insights that previous quantitative studies have not pro-
vided.
7. Results: How much blinding is appropriate?
Background: ICSE has traditionally used a single-blind re-
viewing regime; ICSE 2018 is the first to switch to double-blind
reviewing. Past ICSEs (to our knowledge, from 1987 to 1991)
have required that one of the reviewers be listed at the foot of
the title page of accepted articles as having “recommended” the
work.
We had three agree/disagree items on this topic, which all
received n= 160 answers (100%). The items’ wording and the
response percentages are shown in Figure 3
There is a two-thirds majority agreeing that reviewers should
not know author names (in practice, this means the “double-
blind” regime). In Mulligan et al. (2013), 76% of their cross-
discipline participants considered double-blind peer review the
most effective method; in Bacchelli and Beller (2017), 46% of
their software engineering participants were in favor of all soft-
ware engineering venues to go double-blind.
As for blinding reviewers with respect to the names of the
co-reviewers, sometimes called “triple-blind”, respondents are
split half-and-half.
A potentially surprising result arises for the third question,
zero-blinding: About one third of respondents say they believe
reviewers ought to give up their anonymity and sign their re-
views. The OpenAIRE survey had not asked a “should” ques-
tion, but even for its very openness-minded participants only
44% had agreed zero-blinding would improve review quality
(Ross-Hellauer et al., 2017).
8. Results: Should drafts and reviews be laid open?
We had three agree/disagree items on this topic, which also
all received n = 160 answers (100%). Their wording and the
response percentages are shown in Figure 4.
Respondents are split half-and-half about whether reviews
should be published along with an accepted article. There is
also some limited support for the more radical ideas of publish-
ing article draft and reviews also for rejected articles (31%), or
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To which extent should the reviewing process be open?
Figure 3: How much blinding is appropriate? Answers range from strong disagreement (1) to strong agreement (10).
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once the article is published.
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Figure 4: Should drafts and reviews be laid open?
even publishing the article draft immediately upon submission
(28%). These sentiments are more positive than those found
by Mulligan et al. (2013) and only moderately less enthusias-
tic than those in the OpenAIRE survey (Ross-Hellauer et al.,
2017).
9. Results: Should reviewers be compensated?
9.1. Monetary or quasi-monetary compensation
We asked “Reviewers should receive a (quasi-)monetary
compensation for their work (e.g. memberships, subscriptions,
registration discounts, or money payment). If so, which?”. 41%
of n = 160 respondents agreed (to varying degrees) and 33%
provided a free-text comment on the issue. In those, our open
coding found 14 different types of suggestion mentioned and
142 mentions (100%) overall. 16% of those suggest monetary
compensation, nearly all of the others suggest variants of the
other ideas mentioned in the question, the most popular being
conference registration discounts (43%) and waivers on society
memberships (7%) or subscriptions (10%).
These results reflect a much more honor-based attitude to-
wards reviewing than those from Mulligan et al. (2013), where
41% of participants showed inclination towards monetary and
51% towards quasi-monetary compensations.
In contrast, a few of our respondents even made critical re-
marks on the for-profit culture in much of the scientific pub-
lishing system, like this one: “It is ridiculous we are doing
free work that will ultimately result in more money for Else-
vier/IEEE. Willing to debate if money should go to person or
institution”.
9.2. Showable proof of good work
We also asked “Reviewers should receive showable proof
for good reviewing work (e.g. public visibility of their review
texts, or a reviewing quality certificate). If so, which?”. 71%
of again n= 160 respondents agreed and 51% provided a free-
text comment on the issue. As for the monetary compensation
question, these comments were heavily primed by the examples
given in the question, but contain a number of further ideas as
well. In the 81 comments, our open coding found 31 different
types of suggestion mentioned and 116 mentions (100%) over-
all.
The most common suggestion was indeed handing out a cer-
tificate (suggested by 51% of mentions). Some of these were
more specific, for example they proposed that only the best re-
viewers should get a certificate (16%) or the certificate should
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state the quality of the reviews (11%). Various ideas amount-
ing to other forms of transparency or a reputation system, when
taken together, represent another 27% of mentions, so that these
two categories sum to 78% of mentions, making everything else
minor. Interesting specialized points made by only one or two
respondents in these two or other categories include: publish
certificates centrally, use Publons, mimic StackOverflow, don’t
forget the subreviewers, blacklist bad reviewers.
The only Mulligan et al. (2013) equivalent is “Acknowl-
edgment in the journal”, which 40% of respondents found at-
tractive. The OpenAIRE survey does not report on this issue.
Warne (2016) is specifically about compensation and reports
mean agreement of 4.2 (on a 1-to-5 scale) with “Reviewing
should be acknowledged as a measurable research output”.
Summing up, there is a lot of support for issuing some kind
of reviewing certificate to reviewers and some support for var-
ious forms of quasi-monetary compensation. Overall, our re-
spondents are far more welcoming to showable proof (71% agree-
ment) than to monetary or quasi-monetary compensation (41%
agreement).
Three initiatives are already pursuing goals of the “show-
able proof” type on a general level: Publons6 (for journals only)
counts reviews and also allows publishing them, Academic Karma7
aims at making the content of all reviews and review responses
public and allows signing reviews, Review Quality Collector8
(RQC, currently for conferences only, later also for journals) is-
sues certificates based on an explicit quantitative review quality
assessment.
10. Results: How should the reviewing regime change?
At the end of our survey, we asked our respondents “If you
could change the current review practices at will, what would
you consider the most valuable improvements (and why)?”. This
was a free-text question only (no predefined categories at all)
and it received 118 responses. In those, our (somewhat over-
eager) open coding found an enormous 57 different types of
change suggestion mentioned with 162 mentions (100%) over-
all.
Among these, two stick out by a far margin (with 17% and
15% of mentions, respectively): introduce double-blind review-
ing and introduce open reviewing. Open reviewing in this sense
is a combination of publishing the review (and perhaps the draft
submission) and attaching the reviewer’s name to it, but the re-
spondents provided very different amounts of detail in their de-
scription so not all of them may actually have meant all of these
elements. One could actually use both suggestions in one pro-
cess: prepare the initial review under a double-blind regime,
perhaps even have a discussion with the authors still in double-
blind mode, and then lift anonymity on both sides and publish
the reviews (for accepted or all submissions) and perhaps the
article drafts as well. 5 people indeed mentioned both together,
6http://publons.com
7http://academickarma.org
8http://reviewqualitycollector.org
which is logical if one subscribes to “The most important thing
is to have a symmetrical reviewing process (i.e., either blinded
or unblinded).”. Most proponents of one of these ideas, how-
ever, do not favor the other, with attitudes like this one for the
open reviewing camp: “So many [reviews] are so insightful,
everyone should be able to learn from their critiques!” or this
one against: “Making reviews more visible opens up a can of
worms that will, ultimately, not be helpful. People are vin-
dictive, if you haven’t noticed. Even the best researchers can
have their moments.” and this one for the double-blind camp:
“There is evidence of bias in scientific reviewing and evidence
that double-blind reviewing can reduce it. Experience with light
double blind reviewing in related fields suggests that it is suc-
cessful, low-cost, and has few drawbacks.” or this one wary of
it: “Double blind has good justifications, but it is unfortunate
it also lowers ability of established researchers to push the en-
velope: the low accept rate makes blinded highly novel papers
have low chance of acceptance without a level of experimental
evidence [...]”.
Following these top suggestions are three with 4% of men-
tions each: reward reviewers, rate reviewers, decrease review-
ing load. Also with 4% of mentions comes a category ’novel
process’ with sketches of radical ideas such as this one: “Re-
viewers rank all papers. Authors decide whether or not they
accept to present their work. If and only if they present their
work then their rank is published with a review summary. Au-
thor presentation time is proportional to their rank position.”
The long tail contains a number of straightforward sugges-
tions such as reducing reviewing load, avoiding sub-reviewers,
or introducing rebuttals as well as a few more far-reaching sug-
gestions we found remarkable: (1) Elect (rather than appoint)
program committees. (2) “Build some sort of reviewer rating
system. Reward good reviewers and warn and eventually pun-
ish bad reviewers. Build a culture of valuing good strong re-
views.”, which becomes most interesting in combination with
“People who publish (including co-authors) should be required
to review a comparable amount.”. (3) Get rid of publishing pa-
pers at conferences: “In Computer Science, [we should move]
away from a model in which excellent research is routinely re-
jected only because there was another paper at the same con-
ference that the PC considered to be of equal quality but higher
excitement level”. (4) Physical PC meetings are an important
practice for some (“there are several best practices that help
maintaining high standards, most notably physical PC meet-
ings”) and a threat to good peer review for others (“they are
a drain on everyone and on the environment, and they tend to
favor outcomes advocated by strongly vocal members.”.
We are not aware of similar results from other studies.
11. Results: How these results may change in the future
The responses to our questions regarding blinding, publish-
ing reviews and drafts, or compensating reviewers represent at-
titudes. How will these attitudes change in the future? We asked
our respondents for their age, so we can (and now will) look for
age-related trends in our data.
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11.1. Theoretical assumptions, approach
If we set aside the case of disruptive changes and look only
at trends already represented in our dataset, we see two possi-
bilities:
• Hypothesis G: There is a generational trend; the attitude
of a person is largely stable. If only G were true, the same
attitude of our now-younger respondents today would largely
be the attitude of then-older respondents in twenty years.
• Hypothesis S: There is a seniority trend; the attitude of
a person changes with experience and/or role. If only S
were true, the attitude of our now-older respondents to-
day would likely be the attitude of then-older respondents
in twenty years as well.
Obviously, we should expect a mix of both effects. But is one
of them dominant? Our data cannot provide a definite answer,
but can provide a strong clue, because we have a good proxy
for seniority, experience, and role in our data: The current pro-
fessional position a respondent holds.
We will build linear models of attitudes using age and se-
niority as predictors and see whether one or both are statisti-
cally significant and how large their coefficient (i.e., the respec-
tive effect) is. Where only age is significant, this indicates G
is dominant. Where only seniority is significant, this indicates
S is dominant. Where both are significant, this indicates both
effects mix. Where none of them is significant, this indicates
time trends are weak or non-existing.
There is a problem: age and seniority correlate strongly.
Therefore, we should not expect the linear models to be highly
stable9 Therefore, we will only be able to say which of G or S
is dominant if the difference between the two effects is large.
11.2. Predictor variables
We will use the following predictor variables in the models:
• ageD: age in decades. We use decades rather than years
to make the coefficients larger and easier to read.
• prof: whether or not the respondent is a tenured or non-
tenured professor; this is a proxy of seniority.
• tenured: whether or not the respondent is a tenured pro-
fessor; this is an alternative proxy of seniority.
Each model will have age as a predictor plus zero or one of
the seniority measures, plus possibly the interaction of age and
seniority. For the latter, we will use the notation of R in the
coefficient table, e.g. ageD:profFALSE and ageD:profTRUE.
prof and tenured, being only binary, tend to have less predictive
power, giving the G effect a head start, which we need to keep
in mind for the discussion.
9The instability induced by predictor collinearity is commonly measured
by the variance inflation factor (VIF). Values under 4 are generally considered
totally unproblematic (?). The VIFs in our models range vom 1.39 to 1.82.
11.3. Dependent variables
We try each of the following dependent variables in the
models:
• Pgood: the percentage of “good” reviews.
• Punhelpful: the percentage of “unhelpful” reviews. (The
“reasonable” ones appear less interesting.)
• Pfaulty: the percentage of “grossly faulty” reviews.
• AknowR: whether authors should know who their re-
viewers are. This, as all of the other attitude variables
below, is measured on the 10-point disagree/agree scale
which we always interpret as a difference scale here and
represent it by evenly-spaced fractional numbers in range
−5 . . .5.
• RknowA: whether reviewers should know who their au-
thors are.
• RknowR: whether reviewers should know who their co-
reviewers are.
• openness: the average of the above three.
• opennessChg: ditto, but with the sign of the latter two
components reversed. This represents the attitude towards
change relative to the single-blind regime that was most
common in software engineering (in particular: used at
ICSE) in the timeframe we asked about.
• pubreviews: whether or not reviews should be published
along with accepted articles.
• publicness: the average of all three publicness-related
questions we asked.10
• monetary: whether or not reviewers should receive mon-
etary compensation for their work.
• certificate: whether or not reviewers should receive “show-
able proof” of good reviewing work.
11.4. Model selection method
For each of the 12 dependent variables, we will consider
five different models as follows (60 different models overall)
and present only the most convincing one from each block – or
none, if none is convincing at all. A convincing model needs
all coefficients to have statistical significance and a high R2.
Each candidate model has theoretical plausibility, so we do not
consider this procedure to constitute “fishing for significance”.
Nevertheless, we will use a low significance threshold of p <
0.02 for each coefficient to reduce false positives.
We will show this procedure by spelling the process out for
one of the dependent variables; we will only present end re-
sults for the remainder. Consider Table 1: Each block of rows
10We do not use the other two separately because they were formulated in a
manner that makes their solo interpretation ambiguous.
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Table 1: All five candidate models for dependent variable opennessChg. Our
model selection rules suggest to use model 40 for this variable. Columns and
model selection are explained in the main text.
type name coeff. p R2
36 A+P (intercept) 2.48 0.001 0.070
ageD -0.60 0.003
profTRUE 0.03 0.950
37 A:P (intercept) 2.50 0.003 0.070
ageD:profFALSE -0.60 0.018
ageD:profTRUE -0.60 0.002
38 A+T (intercept) 2.47 0.002 0.070
ageD -0.59 0.009
tenuredTRUE 0.01 0.981
39 A:T (intercept) 2.61 0.006 0.070
ageD:tenuredFALSE -0.64 0.024
ageD:tenuredTRUE -0.61 0.003
40 A (intercept) 2.46 0.000 0.077
ageD -0.59 0.001
represents one model, numbered in the leftmost column. The
second column describes the predictors used in the model: age
and prof separately (A+P); age-and-prof interaction (A:P); ditto
for tenured (A+T; A:T); or age only (A). The third and fourth
column show the coefficients in the model; the fifth the corre-
sponding p value; the final column shows adjusted R2 for the
model: The fraction of variance explained after deducting the
random-chance component for each degree of freedom used by
the model.
Model 36 (this will be the model number in our overall
models list) in Table 1 tells us that agreement with reviewing
regime change (opennessChg) is 2.48, halfway between total
agreement and a neutral stance, if the respondent is a baby (0
decades old) and not a professor (profTRUE is 0). By the age
of 20, agreement will have fallen to 1.28 and by the age of 50
to -0.52. However, the seniority effect (profTRUE) has has a
non-significant coefficient, so the whole model is not meaning-
ful. Model 38, which replaces prof by tenured, is very similar;
both cannot be used.
Model 37 uses the interaction of ageD and prof instead of
using them side-by-side; all three coefficients are significant, so
this could be a useful model. However, both coefficients of the
interaction are practically the same, so this is not a meaning-
ful model either. Its cousin, model 39, behaves similarly. The
coefficients are a bit more different, but the first interaction co-
efficient is no longer significant, so this model also cannot be
used.
Model 40, the simplest of them all, using only age for pre-
diction, is the only convincing model and hence the one we
select. Much like model 36, it says agreement is at 1.28 for the
average 20-year-old respondent and -0.49 for a 50-year-old.
11.5. Results
We discuss all dependent variables in order. Where a con-
vincing (or semi-convincing) model was found, it is shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: Best model for each dependent variable where a convincing model was
found. The interpretation is explained in the main text.
type name coeff. p R2
25 A:P (intercept) -3.93 0.000 0.028
RknowA ageD 0.61 (0.026)
30 A (intercept) -3.05 0.011 0.041
RknowR ageD 0.76 0.009
40 A (intercept) 2.46 0.000 0.077
opennessChg ageD -0.59 0.001
52 A:P (intercept) 0.99 0.000 0.050
monetary ageD:profFALSE -0.17 0.007
ageD:profTRUE -0.14 0.003
57 A:P (intercept) 1.09 0.000 0.015
certificate ageD:profFALSE -0.11 (0.046)
ageD:profTRUE -0.07 (0.072)
Models 1–15. Neither of the variables Pgood, Punhelpful,
Pfaulty has any model at all with all-significant coefficients, so
models 1 to 15 are all missing from the table. This tells us that
the perception of review quality appears to be a timeless phe-
nomenon.11 We will use this term, timeless, for similar cases of
no-good-model-at-all below.
Models 16–30. AknowR, the practice of reviewers sign-
ing their reviews, is timeless: Our respondents are all similarly
skeptical. Strictly speaking, RknowA is timeless as well, but
it has one model, 25, close enough to significance that we in-
clude it here for information: Older respondents appear much
less adamant that authors should be hidden from reviewers.
RknowR model 30 shows a relatively strong age effect: Younger
respondents tend to prefer hiding reviewers’ names from each
other, ones over the age of 40 no longer think so.
Models 31–35. AknowR, RknowA, RknowR all represent
a form of openness (transparency) in the reviewing process, so
averaging them describes attitudes towards openness in general.
But none of the models 31 to 35 is convincing; the openness
attitude as a whole is timeless.
Models 36–40. Given that it is currently the norm in soft-
ware engineering (at conferences) that reviewers know authors
and each other, we can reverse the sign of variables RknowA
and RknowR and compute an “inclination towards change from
the current openness regime”. This is the variable we have dis-
cussed in the example in Section 11.4: Young respondents are
inclined to change, older ones much less so (model 40).
Models 41–50. How about some other form of transparency:
publishing the reviews? Both variables, pubreviews and public-
ness, are completely timeless: None of the models can explain
more than 0.4% of the variance.
Models 51–60. Finally, there is the issue of compensating
reviewers. Model 52 is the first two-variable model that comes
out as most convincing. It states that young respondents tend to
think (if only with a rather weak majority) that reviewers should
be compensated (quasi)monetarily. Older ones believe this less,
11More precisely: Age and seniority effects are too weak to show up in a
dataset of the size we have. This also suggests the estimates are largely unbi-
ased.
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reaching the zero point at the age of 59 if they are not profes-
sors and 73 if they are.12 The corresponding model 57 for non-
monetary compensation behaves in the same manner, except its
coefficients are not fully significant and the age effect becomes
so weak that only 100-year-olds13 stop believing-at-least-a-bit
that issuing certificates to reviewers would be worthwhile. We
include this model for comparison.
11.6. Interpretation
Overall, there is not a single A+P model with a significant
profTRUE coefficient and not a single A+T model with a sig-
nificant tenuredTRUE coefficient. This tells us that seniority
effects, if they exist at all, cannot be strong. Therefore, the age
effects found are likely mostly generation effects (hypothesis
G), not seniority effects (hypothesis S).
Summing the results up, we see that while there are gen-
erational effects here and there, they are not very strong. We
should not expect reviewing to change drastically just because
the now-younger generation will advance to positions of power.
Explicit change initiatives will likely be required instead.
12. Limitations
Despite our relatively good response rate of 29%, our sam-
ple is obviously not representative of the base population, as is
easy to see from the demographics in Section 4. By assuming
age and status distributions for our base population we could
in principle correct for this distortion, but we consider this too
unreliable and so do not do it. So the study is limited in that
our characterization of what population it represents remains
imprecise.
As with any survey, the truthfulness and well-reflectiveness
of the answers is not certain, but we saw no signs of distorted
responses and our base population can be considered as a se-
rious one. Therefore, we expect this problem to be negligible.
The same is true for accidentally wrong inputs.
The evaluation, both the statistical and the qualitative one,
is mostly straightforward, so we do not expect grave mistakes
to have gotten seriously in the way of the correctness of our
reported results. In any case, other researchers can check based
on our fully disclosed data (see Section 3.5).
The strongest threat to validity concerns Section 11: Our
trend analysis requires the assumption that attitudes such as
those surveyed here tend to be stable. There is evidence that
this is the case (Schwarz and Bohner, 2001), but it still remains
an assumption. Fortunately, no strong conclusions arise from
that analysis and need to rest on that assumption, so the actual
threat to validity is small.
13. Conclusions
Our survey of perceptions of and attitudes towards contem-
porary peer review in software engineering research among a
12The more exact coefficients are 0.9947, 0.1674, and 0.1361.
13Professors even need to wait until they are 153.
rather senior subset of the ICSE 2014, 2015, 2016 reviewers
and authors brought the following major findings:
1. The respondents agree with a multitude of purposes that
could be ascribed to peer review. The strongest agree-
ment (at 96%) is with the purpose of ensuring the validity
of the research in question (Section 5).
2. The respondents are skeptical regarding the quality that
software engineering reviews typically have today: On
average, they deem only one third of all reviews they
receive to be of good quality, while another third is ei-
ther useless or grossly faulty (Section 6.1). If these per-
ceptions are correct, software engineering reviewing is
severely broken and a lot of time, nerves, and goodwill
of all involved get wasted. Given the key role of peer re-
view in the scientific process, we should make efforts to
improve this situation.
3. When asked for the reasons why the grossly faulty re-
views are faulty, the respondents offered several dozen
possibilities. The top three of these, however, cover half
of the answers: Reviewers not investing enough time (24%
of mentions), reviewers not knowing enough about the
subject area (22%), and reviewers not caring to prepare a
good review (10%) (Section 6.2). None of the three is in-
surmountable: Time investment is a matter of priorities,
lack of expertise can be accommodated by not taking on
the review in the first place, and a lack of care stems from
a modifiable (if not easily) attitude. Improvement efforts
can be successful in principle.
4. We asked respondents for their worst peer review experi-
ence from the author perspective, which sheds some light
on how reviews are broken when they are considered to
be very broken. The top few categories account for 42%
of mentions: A lack of justification of something impor-
tant (26%), overly short reviews (7%) or some other form
of apparent reviewer laziness (9%) (Section 6.3). Even
if many reviewers indeed lack the skill to notice which
statements in their reviews require justification, this is
something that could be taught and trained; the other
problems are even more straightforward to avoid – again:
in principle; if one wants to.
5. Our question on the worst peer review experience from
the reviewer perspective shows that authors and editors
or PC chairs also have their share of responsibility for
the bad state of peer review, but the manners and reasons
are more varied here (Section 6.4).
6. As for blinding, two thirds of respondents agreed author
names should be hidden from reviewers (double-blind re-
viewing), half agreed co-reviewer names should be hid-
den, and one third agreed reviewer names should not be
hidden from authors (zero-blind reviewing). So, although
few software engineering reviewers currently appear to
sign their reviews, not so few appear to be willing to go
the route opposite to the current trend towards double-
blind reviewing and go fully transparent instead (Sec-
tion 7).
7. Half of the respondents also agree that review texts should
be published along accepted articles (Section 8).
13
8. 41% of our respondents agreed that reviewers should re-
ceive monetary or quasi-monetary compensation for their
work, the latter being preferred (Section 9.1).
9. 71% agreed that reviewers should receive showable proof
of good work as a compensation. Half of the specific sug-
gestions in this regard amount to some kind of certificate
(Section 9.2).
10. When asked how they would change the current review-
ing regime if they could, our respondents produced a broad
set of suggestions. Two of them were more popular than
the rest: Introducing double-blind reviewing, covering
17% of mentions, or introducing open (zero-blind and
published) reviewing at 15%. (Section 10).
11. We investigated how many of the above estimates and
attitudes depend on age and/or seniority (i.e. experience
and role) and found almost no seniority effects and only a
few weak or modest age effects (Section 11). This means
one should not expect the reviewing regime to change
quickly just because the current senior researcher genera-
tion retires; an explicit effort to change the attitude of the
software engineering community as a whole will likely
be required.
Existing (non-SE) venues such as F1000Research, ScienceOpen,
or The BMJ show that “radical” solutions like non-anonymous,
public reviewing are possible; many of the current issues with
peer review quality likely shrink to modest proportions under
such conditions. Furthermore, initiatives such as Publons and
Review Quality Collector provide ideas how even anonymous
regimes can be improved. How about some experimentation?
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